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Abstract
Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its bud-
get to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate
the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this
proposition, I show that the optimal type of agent depends on whether or
not committing to a greater share for recipients where the productivity
of aid is low is eﬃciency-enhancing. This is the case for donors not too
concerned with redistribution. They would therefore benefit from delegat-
ing the determination of the discretionary allocation rule to agents more
sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
JEL-codes: F35, O11.
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1 Introduction
Donor countries distribute foreign aid to recipient countries in two main ways:
directly or indirectly through intermediaries such as NGOs and the World Bank.
Table 1 demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the importance of
intermediaries in the allocation of aid among the member countries of the De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. For example, whereas
Canada disbursed 11% of its oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) in 2001
through NGOs, five times the unweighted mean for the DAC countries, Aus-
tralia’s use of such agents was all but negligible. More than 70% of Italy’s net
disbursements went to multilateral institutions, while for Canada the share was
only marginally above one-fifth. Subtracting contributions to NGOs from the
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bilateral share of ODA and adding it to the multilateral one, one arrives at a
rough division of disbursements in terms of whether the responsibility for allo-
cating the funds is delegated or not.1 It may be seen that in terms of the share
of total disbursements, intermediaries controlled about 35% of the total, which
was about 52.3 billion USD.2
[Table 1 about here]
These figures demonstrate the importance of delegation in the distribution
of foreign aid. How may we explain the patterns displayed in table 1? Most
theoretical analyses of foreign aid concern a generic donor, with delegation not
being an issue.3 There are of course many possible reasons for delegating the re-
sponsibility for aid allocation to agents. Here I will focus on strategic incentives
for delegation: as in many other contexts, delegating policy to an agent may
allow donors to avoid problems of dynamic inconsistency. Specifically, delega-
tion may help altruistic bilateral donors alleviate their Samaritan’s Dilemma;
the strategic adaptation of behaviour by recipient country governments in the
expectation that donors will rush in to satisfy the needs that recipients leave
unfulfilled.4
Svensson (2000a) find that delegating aid policy to an agent that is less
inequality-oriented than themselves results in better outcomes from the per-
spective of bilateral donors. However, the figures in table 1 cast doubts over
the explanatory power of his model. The substantial variation in delegation
patterns suggest that a monotone relationship between donor and agent prefer-
ences is not empirically realistic. It is well-known from studies of aid allocation
that on average bilateral aid is more driven by donor interests than by recipient
needs, with the latter concerns more strongly present in the funding decisions of
multilateral agencies.5 This is because strategic and commercial interests loom
1Woods (2000) claims that OECD statistics underestimate the role played by NGOs. The
underestimation is due to the financing of service provision by NGOs at the request of bi-
lateral aid agencies as well as the distribution of emergency aid through NGOs not being
recorded as aid disbursed to NGOs. However, in order to analyse strategic delegation, which
is the objective of this paper, the oﬃcial figures are the right ones since the allocation of the
categories of funds omitted is not at the discretion of the NGOs. As OECD statistics exclude
bilateral transfers to the multilaterals for purposes predetermined by the former actors, the
same argument applies to the numbers shown for multilateral aid.
2The shares of both NGOs and multilateral institutions have been increasing slightly over
1998-2001 (from 2% to 2.2% and from 32.9% to 33.1%, respectively).
3 See e.g. Hagen (2000), Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2003), Pedersen (1996, 2001), and
Svensson (2000a,b). A partial exception is Torsvik (2003), who studies whether two donors
would benefit from cooperating. Azam and Laﬀont (2003) look at the role played by local
NGOs in a developing country when a donor and the government engage in poverty alleviation,
but only in their capacity as potential agents of the latter.
4The Samaritan’s Dilemma was first laid out by Buchanan (1975), who sees it as a major
problem of modern welfare states. Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) provide a formal and general
analysis, noting in their conclusion that the relationship between aid donors and recipients
might be studied within this framework. For actual applications of the Samaritan’s Dilemma
to foreign aid, see Pedersen (1996, 2001) and Svensson (2000a). Strictly speaking, altruism
is only involved if the aid budget is endogenous (as in Pedersen 1996). However, similar
dilemmas arise when donors care about several recipients and is to some extent concerned
with distributional issues (as is the case in Pedersen 2001, Svensson 2000a, and in this paper).
5A non-exhaustive list of studies investigating the allocation patterns of various bilateral
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large in the calculations of countries such as France, Japan, and the US. On the
other hand, some small bilateral donors - in particular, the Scandinavian coun-
tries and the Netherlands - tend to concentrate their economic assistance in the
poorest developing countries. Hence, they may be characterised as fairly averse
to inequality among recipients. Based on Svensson (2000a) we would expect
that these donors could benefit from delegating policy to a multilateral agency
such as the World Bank. Many of the most influential member countries in the
Bank have other concerns high on their agenda, making it likely that the alloca-
tion of its funds is less poverty-oriented than the one that for instance Norway
or Sweden would have chosen had they distributed the money themselves. The
numbers in table 1 are not inconsistent with such an explanation even though
the shares of multilateral aid in the total ODA of the Scandinavian countries
and the Netherlands tend to be below the DAC average in 2001.6 But why
would the US leave more than a quarter of its ODA in the care of multilateral
agencies in which it has considerable less leeway to pursue its commercial and
strategic interests, i.e., delegate responsibility for a substantial chunk of its aid
budget to agents that must be judged more averse to inequality among recipient
countries than itself? Similarly, why would France give almost 40% of its aid
budget to multilaterals much less prone to display the same kind of favouritism
towards its former colonies as it does in its bilateral assistance programme?
In this paper, I analyse a model where, depending on donor preferences, the
optimal mandate of an agent could dictate either less or more inequality-aversion
than the principal’s own preferences. It shares the essential feature of the one
studied by Svensson (2000a), namely, that there are two recipient countries
locked in a competition for aid that weakens their incentives to improve their
own lot as this results in a reduction in aid. The only important change is
that the productivity of aid is allowed to vary between recipient countries. I
show that it is not in general true that a donor would choose an agent that
is less concerned with relative poverty than itself. In fact, for some parameter
values, it is optimal to delegate policy responsibility to an agent that is more
averse to inequality than the donor. The reason is that ex post, the allocation
of aid tends to favour the recipient country where the productivity of aid is
high. However, other things being equal investment is most valuable ex ante
in the low-productivity recipient due to the large amount of aid that would be
required in order to generate an equivalent increase in consumption. Therefore,
it is optimal for donor types not too concerned about inequality to pick an agent
that favours these countries more strongly than themselves, i.e., an agent that
seeks to smooth consumption to a greater extent than such donors would if they
and multilateral donors include Alesina and Dollar (2000), Boone (1996), Boschini and Olof-
sgård (2003), Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1997), Chauvet (2002), Maizels and Nissanke (1984),
Rao (1997), and Rodrik (1995).
6As was pointed out in footnote 2, the average share of multilateral aid in the DAC coun-
tries has increased slightly over 1998-2001. The share of such aid in the total ODA of the
Netherlands has fluctuated somewhat around the level attained in 2001 in this period while
that of Norway has increased by a couple of percentage points. On the other hand, Denmark
and Sweden have decreased the share of their budget reserved for the multilaterals notably
during this period (by about four and six percentage points, respectively).
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were in charge of executing policy.
The result derived by Svensson (2000a) obtains for donors that are rela-
tively strongly motivated to smooth consumption diﬀerentials between recipi-
ents. Such donor types will benefit from choosing an agent more “conservative”
than themselves as this will lead to a more eﬃcient allocation of investment
eﬀort among recipients. In sum, the benefits from delegation stem from the
possibility of alleviating some of the negative incentive eﬀects of ex post aid
allocation. The kind of agent that is optimal therefore depends whether or not
it is eﬃciency-enhancing to stimulate more investment in the recipient where
the productivity of aid is low than what would obtain if the donor’s own ex post
allocation rule was applied.
The model is outlined in the next section, where the optimal aid allocation
under commitment and the resulting investment in the recipient countries are
presented as well. In section 3, similar results are derived for the case where the
donor operates under discretion, i.e., allocates its aid budget after the recipients
have made their investments. The delegation decision is analysed in section 4.
Section 5 contains my concluding remarks.
2 The Model and a Benchmark
Consider the following three variants of a three-stage model, illustrated in table
2. If a donor can commit to an aid policy, i.e., a distribution of its budget be-
tween two recipients, the timing is as follows. In stage 1, the donor decides on
its optimal policy. Fully aware of this policy, the recipients then choose a level
of investment. In the final stage, the aid policy is executed. The equilibrium
outcome in this regime, denoted by P , serves as a benchmark for evaluating
the equilibrium of the second and more realistic case, when the donor cannot
precommit its policy. It then chooses the allocation of its budget in stage 3. In
stage 2 of regime D, the recipients simultaneously choose how much to invest,
taking into account both the direct returns to investment and the indirect eﬀects
that investment has on total income in stage 3 through its impact on the alloca-
tion of aid. In the delegation regime (A), the donor may delegate aid policy to
a hand-picked agent prior to the recipients making their decisions. This means
that the responsibility for allocating the donor’s fixed aid budget at stage 3 is
left to the agent. In all other respects, this case is identical to the discretionary
regime without delegation.
[Table 2 about here]
The donor’s preferences over the stage 3 consumption levels in two recipient
countries, L and H, are
WD =
X
j
UD (Cj) =



P
j
(Cj)
1−ηD
1−ηD
, 0 < ηD <∞, ηD 6= 1;P
j
lnCj , ηD = 1.
(1)
ηD = −
CjUcc
Uc
is the elasticity of marginal utility. It is also a measure of the
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degree to which the donor is concerned with the distribution of consumption
between the two recipients. The higher ηD is, the stronger is the inclination to
smooth diﬀerences in consumption levels, other things being equal. I will speak
of this parameter as the donor’s degree of inequality-aversion. The delegation
decision that will be analysed below concerns whether a donor operating under
discretion will find it in its interest to delegate aid policy to an agent with a
mandate diﬀerent from the preferences of the donor. Specifically, I will evaluate
whether it is optimal to pick an agent for which ηA 6= ηD.7
The donor seeks to maximise this objective function subject to the following
resource constraints
BL +BH ≤ B; (2a)
Cj = Yj + γjBj, j = L,H. (2b)
(2a) just states that transfers to the two recipients cannot exceed the total
aid budget, which is constant. (2b) expresses the consumption of each recipient
as the sum of the income generated domestically, Yj , and aid times the pro-
ductivity of aid, γj . The productivity of aid, which is the marginal impact of
aid on consumption, might diﬀer between the two recipients. A number of fac-
tors could give rise to such diﬀerences. For example, corruption might be more
widespread in one recipient than the other or the eﬃciency of public spending
might be lower due to lower levels of bureaucratic capacity.8
In stage 2 of the game, recipients choose investment levels in order to max-
imise
V (E − Ij) +
¡
Yj + γjBj
¢
. (3)
That is, investment is financed from an endowment of E and generates a
stage 3 domestic income of Yj = f (Ij), with f (Ij) being strictly increasing
and concave.9 Whereas stage 2 consumption is valued according to a strictly
increasing and concave function V (·), stage 3 consumption enters the recipients’
objective functions linearly. As the perceptive reader will have noticed, I assume
that the donor does not to care about the resources recipients spend in stage
2 (E − Ij). One way to interpret this assumption is that the donor sees the
amount not invested as wasted, perhaps because it is consumed by the elite of
7This is the same type of objective function that Svensson (2000a) uses to analyse this
issue. The fact that ηD is constant of course simplifies the analysis of delegation and in the
current context using this objective function has the added benefit of facilitating comparison
with his results.
8 Svensson (2000a) assumes decreasing returns to aid, with the relationship between aid
and consumption being the same in the two recipient countries. While decreasing returns
is probably a more realistic assumption than constant marginal eﬀects of aid, it seems more
likely than not that the impact of aid varies across recipients. The gain in analytical simplicity
tips the balance in favour of switching assumptions from decreasing and identical eﬀects of
aid to constant but asymmetric.
9 In contrast, income is exogenous but stochastic in Svensson (2000a) and the recipients
instead exert “eﬀort” that increases the probability of being in a state where income is high.
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the recipient countries only. Pedersen (1996) uses a similar assumption in his
analysis of aid and investment, the interpretation there being that the donor
is only concerned with growth. It does not aﬀect the results derived below
as the objective functions of the donor and recipient governments also diﬀer
in Svensson (2000a). In any case, with two (or more) recipients divergence
between the preferences of the donor and recipients seems realistic as one would
not expect any one recipient country to care about consumption in the another,
at least not to the same extent as a rich donor.
The assumption that recipients are risk-neutral is not crucial either. The
formulation is chosen because it has two convenient implications. Firstly, it gen-
erates a clear-cut benchmark against which the discretionary equilibria with and
without delegation may be evaluated. As I demonstrate shortly, the outcome is
that there is no reduction in investment from receiving aid in the commitment
regime. Other specifications of the objective-function will generate crowding-
out of domestic investment by aid in the commitment case too, but as long
as aid is given to supplement domestic incomes it will always be the case that
the investment level is lower in the discretionary equilibrium. As will become
apparent, the formulation chosen illustrates this in a very clear manner. The
second benefit from assuming linearity in Cj is that the investment levels in the
two recipient countries are not interdependent in the discretionary regime. This
result is demonstrated in section 3.
When recipients make their choice after the donor has committed to some
allocation
©
BPL , B
P
H
ª
, it is readily apparent that their decision is unaﬀected by
the distribution of aid. This is confirmed by the first-order condition for optimal
investment, which is in this case
−V 0 (E − Ij) + f 0 (Ij) = 0, j = L,H. (4)
The solution entails the same level of investment in both countries: IPj ≡ IP ,
j = L,H. The level of income generated domestically is therefore also identical
and independent of the aid allocation.
When the donor makes its choice in stage 1, it is fully aware that its donations
do not aﬀect recipient country investment. Inserting the constraints (2a) and
(2b) into the objective function and taking the derivative with respect to BL
yields the following first-order condition for an optimal aid allocation:10
∂WD
∂BL
= (CL)
−ηD γL − (CH)
−ηD γH = 0. (5)
From this condition, Proposition 1 follows:11
Proposition 1
a) If γL = γH , the optimal ex ante aid allocation is not a function of ηD.
Hence, BPL = B
P
H =
1
2B.
10 In the main text, I concentrate on the case ηD 6= 1. The proofs of all Propositions and
Lemmas are in the appendix.
11 I assume that the aid budget is always large enough to ensure an interior solution, i.e.,
that BPj ≥ 0, j = L,H regardless of the level of Y P . More precisely, I assume that B exceeds
some critical value that depends on the parameters of the model.
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b) If γL 6= γH , the optimal ex ante aid allocation is BPj = ΠPj RP − yPj , j =
L,H, where ΠPj is the optimal share of total available resources measured in aid
equivalents, RP = B + yPL + y
P
H , distributed to j and y
P
j =
Y Pj
γj
is the domestic
income of j measured in this way.
Part a) of the proposition states that if aid is equally productive in the two
recipient countries, the degree of aversion to relative poverty does not matter
for the optimal split of the aid budget. The reason is that then the donor would
always want to equalise consumption levels, i.e., have CL = CH . Since the
two recipients invest equally much in equilibrium and thus produce the same
amount of aid equivalents, this in turn means that they should get half of the
aid budget each.12
For the remainder of the paper I assume that γL < γH . That is, aid is more
productive in terms of generating consumption in recipient country H. Part b)
of the proposition then informs us that the optimal allocation depends on the
degree of inequality aversion through ΠPj , which is a function of ηD. As may
be deduced directly from (5), C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD . Thus, H has the highest level of
consumption regardless of the value of ηD.
13 However, the ratio C
P
H
CPL
is smaller
the higher ηD is, as the donor is then more willing to sacrifice some of the
overall power of aid in terms of raising the combined consumption levels in the
recipient countries in order to have a more equal distribution of consumption
between them. In other words, the consumption share of L in terms of aid
equivalents in the precommitment regime, ΠPL , is increasing in ηD.14 Moreover,
ΠPL R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1. For ease of reference, I state this as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1
a) ∂Π
P
L
∂ηD
> 0;
b) ΠPL R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1.
c) LimηD→0ΠPL = 0 and LimηD→∞ΠPL =
γH
γL+γH
> 12 .
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
12This is the reason why Svensson (2000a) needs to assume that recipient countries poten-
tially could be diﬀerent ex post due to exogeneous shocks. If recipients could not be asym-
metric ex post, they would receive half the aid budget regardless of the inequality-aversion of
the agency in charge of allocation and so delegation would not change anything. As I assume
ex ante asymmetry from now on, ex post asymmetry does not add anything but notational
complexity. I therefore disregard the possibility of recipients being hit by shocks.
13This is not the case in terms of aid equivalents. C
P
H/γH
CP
L
/γL
=
ΠPH
ΠP
L
. As will be demonstrated
shortly in Lemma 1, if ηD > 1 ΠPL > 0.5 and so this ratio is less than one.
14Obviously, ΠPH = 1 − ΠPL , so that in the following we need only look at the share going
to L.
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3 Optimal Aid Policy under Discretion
We now turn to the case where the donor cannot precommit its aid policy. It
is then chosen at stage 3 of the game, after the level of investment has been
determined by the two recipients. Since the constraints are of the same form as
in the precommitment case, it should be clear that the first-order condition for
an optimal ex post distribution of the aid budget looks exactly the same as in
the precommitment case. The only diﬀerence is that as recipients now are able
to incorporate the eﬀect of their investment on the distribution of aid, it will be
evaluated at diﬀerent levels of domestic incomes in these countries. That is, we
will have RD 6= RP . Hence, we have Proposition 2
Proposition 2
The optimal ex post aid allocation is BDj = ΠDj RD − yDj , j = L,H.
It is important to note that the share of total available resources in terms of
aid equivalents consumed by each recipient is the same as in the precommitment
case: ΠDj = ΠPj ≡ Π∗j . However, the eﬀects of this allocation rule is now
radically diﬀerent. In essence, the recipients see the donor as “confiscating”
their domestic incomes and returning a fraction of their combined incomes plus
the aid budget. The optimal levels of consumption are
CDj = Yj + γjB
D
j = γjΠ∗jRD, j = L,H. (6)
Hence,
∂CDj
∂Yj
= 1 + γj
∂BDj
∂Yj
= Π∗j , j = L,H. (7)
That is, since
∂BDj
∂Yj =
1
γj
¡
Π∗j − 1
¢
< 0, recipients see themselves as collecting
only a fraction of the stage 3 returns to investment. As long as Π∗L 6= 12 , which
is the case for ηD 6= 1, L and H experience diﬀerent aid-adjusted returns to
investment and will therefore invest diﬀerent amounts even though they are
identical in all respects save the productivity of aid. The first-order condition
for optimal investment is
−V 0 (E − Ij) +Π∗jf 0
¡
IDj
¢
= 0, j = L,H. (8)
Unless Π∗j = 1, IDj < IPj , j = L,H. As was demonstrated in Lemma 1,
we will always have an interior solution in terms of the consumption share of
L measured in aid equivalents. Thus, there is underinvestment in both coun-
tries compared to the precommitment case. It follows that donors are worse oﬀ
compared to the commitment regime: the relative distribution of consumption
is the same, but the level of resources available is lower. This is the version of
the Samaritan’s Dilemma the donor is facing here: its eﬀort to increase the con-
sumption levels of the recipient countries ex post undermines their own eﬀorts.
Each recipient is in eﬀect taxed at a rate 1−Π∗j through the aid allocation mech-
anism, a portion of the increase in domestic income generated by investment
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being transferred to the other recipient country. Conscious of this, recipients re-
duce their investment levels, the result being that the level of resources available
for consumption at stage 3 goes down. Naturally, the less they are “taxed”, the
more they invest:
dIDj
dΠ∗j
= −
·
f 0(IDj )
V 00(E−Ij)+Π∗j f 00(IDj )
¸
> 0. However, as a greater
share going to one recipient inevitably means less to the other yD = yDL + y
D
H
need not increase. To derive the properties of yD with respect to Π∗L, I assume
that V (·) has a constant elasticity of marginal utility, µ, and that f (Ij) = κIj .
Calculating IDj is then a straightforward exercise. Moreover, so is proving that
yD is a strictly concave function of Π∗L with a maximum at15
bΠ = (γH) µ1+µ
(γL)
µ
1+µ + (γH)
µ
1+µ
∈
µ
1
2
,
γH
γL + γH
¶
(9)
As already noted, aid is less productive in L, but the other side of that coin
is that a unit gain in the domestic income of L generates a greater increase in
yD than a corresponding gain in YH . This is why bΠ > 12 .
The eﬀect on yD is the change in eﬃciency from shifting responsibility to
an agent with other distributional preferences. In the next section I will show
that this eﬀect decides the question of what kind of agent the donor would
like to delegate aid policy to. I therefore summarise these important results in
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3
yD is a strictly concave function of Π∗L with a unique maximum at bΠ.
Table 2 illustrates the relationship between the sum of domestic aid-equivalent
incomes in the recipient countries in the discretionary regime measured in and
the consumption share of the low-productivity country in terms of the same
measuring rod.
[Figure 2 about here]
From this proposition and Lemma 1, the following useful result follows:
Lemma 2
∃1 < bη <∞ such that Π∗L = bΠ.
That is, since the consumption share of L in terms of aid equivalents is a
strictly increasing function of ηD with a value that is lower than 0.5 for ηD < 1
and bΠ ∈ ³ 12 , γHγL+γH ´, it must be the case that there is a donor type bη > 1 that
has preferences such that its optimal ex post distribution rule maximises the
domestic incomes of the recipients.
We are now in a position to investigate whether a donor at stage 1 would like
to leave the responsibility for allocating B in stage 3 to an agent with preferences
that diﬀer from its own.
15This also allows me to derive an explicit expression for the income lost in the recipient
countries due to the donor being unable to commit to an allocation rule before investments
are made. It can be shown that yP − yD = κ
µ−1
µ
"
(Π∗L)
− 1
µ−1
γL
+
(Π∗H)
− 1
µ−1
γH
#
> 0.
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4 The Delegation Decision
In stage 1 of the game, the donor makes the delegation decision. That is, it
decides whether to relieve itself of the task of executing aid policy in stage 3
by delegating the responsibility to an agent, and if so, what type of agent it
would like to pick. The choice will be made knowing that the agent will be
free to pursue an aid policy that satisfies its preferences. The solution will be
an allocation of aid of the form shown in Propositions 1 and 2, with only the
share of total available resources going to L being diﬀerent. Since this share is
monotonically increasing in η, the optimal mandate for an agent, which amounts
to picking some ηA, can be reduced to deciding on ΠAL . Therefore the donor’s
problem is
MaxΠAL WD =
¡
γLΠALRA
¢1−ηD
1− ηD
+
¡
γH
¡
1−ΠAL
¢
RA
¢1−ηD
1− ηD
, (10)
taking into account the fact that yA is a function of ΠAL through the eﬀect
it has on investment in stage 2.
The first-order condition for a maximum is
∂WD
∂ΠAL
=
¡
CAL
¢−ηD dCAL
dΠAL
+
¡
CAH
¢−ηD dCAH
dΠAL
= 0 (11)
⇔
·
RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
¸
+
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA
·¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL
−RA
¸
= 0.
Here I have made use of the fact that in stage 3, C
A
L
CAH
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1
ηA . Note as
well that changing ΠAL has both a distributional eﬀect and an eﬀect on total
available resources in stage 3. An increase in ΠAL obviously entails a gain for
recipient L, while H loses RA at the margin. Whether the eﬃciency eﬀect is
positive or negative depends on the sign of ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
.
The first-order condition may be rewritten as
µ
ηD − ηA
ηA
¶
ln
µ
γL
γH
¶
= ln


RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
RA −
¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL

 , (12)
which implicitly defines ηA∗. From the results derived in the last section,
we know that ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
R 0 ⇔ ΠAL Q bΠ. Lemma 2 informs us that there exists
an ηA > 1 such that ΠAL = bΠ. Stated diﬀerently, it says that there exists a
donor type bη > 1 such that Π∗L = bΠ. If such a donor evaluate the benefits
from delegating to an agent with a diﬀerent degree of inequality-aversion, it will
note that at ηA = bη, ΠAL = bΠ. Therefore ∂yA∂ΠAL = 0 at this point, and so the
right-hand side of (12) is zero. Then equality can only be obtained if ηA = bη.
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Thus, such a donor type see no need to delegate the responsibility for aid policy.
The intuition is that in order to benefit from delegation, the negative incentive
eﬀects of aid must be reduced. However, given that the agent will be operating
under discretion, one can do no better than maximising the combined domestic
income of the recipients. Since this is the case when L is given a consumption
share in terms of aid equivalents of bΠ, such a donor has nothing to gain from
delegation.
For donor types less concerned with relative poverty than bη, starting at
their true preferences it will be the case that ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
> 0. This means that the
expression in square brackets on the right-hand side is greater than 1, and so
its logarithm is positive. Since γL < γH , the sign of the left-hand side is the
negative of the sign of ηD−ηAηA . Therefore, at the optimum, ηD < ηA∗. In other
words, the optimal agent is more concerned with poverty than the donor, not
less. This is the exact opposite of the result derived by Svensson (2000a). In
the context of this model, his result only obtains if ηD > bη. Then the donor
is too concerned with inequality in the sense that it is possible to elicit greater
“eﬀort” by the recipients in the aggregate by delegating responsibility for aid
policy to someone less inequality-averse than the donor. As the distortion of
the distribution is negligible starting from ηA = ηD whereas the eﬃciency gain
is of the first-order, it is optimal to for such donors to tie their hands by giving
a more “conservative” agent the responsibility for allocating their aid budget ex
post.
The second-order condition, which is examined in the appendix, confirms
that we have found diﬀerent maxima. Proposition 4 is therefore established:
Proposition 4
a) When ηD = bη, there are no benefits from strategically delegating aid
policy to an agent with preferences diﬀerent from the donor.
b) When ηD 6= bη, the donor will benefit from delegation. If ηD > bη (ηD < bη)
the optimal agent is less (more) concerned with inequality than the donor.
The intuition behind this proposition is that there is no point in delegating
responsibility unless there is an eﬃciency gain. In and of itself, the ex post
distribution is optimal for the donor given its preferences. The problem is that
ex post allocation of aid generates negative incentive eﬀects resulting in lower
levels of investment than under commitment. When ηD 6= bη the total domestic
income of the recipients is not maximised and so changing the allocation rule
can have positive eﬀects. The type of agent is determined by whether more
redistribution towards L increases or reduces the amount of resources available
in stage 3. Figure 2 illustrates that this depends on whether ηD Q bη.
A final point to note is that delegation cannot achieve the commitment
outcome. This is due to the fact that if competition for aid is not eliminated,
negative incentive eﬀects remain. And as long as the agent is operating under
discretion, recipients take into account that their stage 3 consumption levels are
interdependent due to the aid allocation mechanism. Hence, investment levels
will still be below those attained in the commitment regime for both recipients.
It follows that donors are still worse oﬀ compared to what they could achieve
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with the ex ante optimal policy. A donor of type bη cannot improve on WDD ,
the level of its objective function attained in the discretionary regime without
delegation. As noted in section 3, this is clearly lower than WPD as the relative
distribution of consumption is the same in the two regimes while yD < yP so
that there are less resources available for consumption in stage 3. Donor types
for which ηD 6= bη can improve on WDD through strategic delegation, but still
cannot reach WPD : L’s share of total consumption measured in aid equivalents
is no longer equal to Π∗L and yA < yP .
5 Conclusions and Extensions
It is known from analyses of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the context of aid
that the intervention of an altruistic donor might produce counterproductive
eﬀects through strategic recipient behaviour. Svensson (2000a) has suggested
that the problem might be alleviated by delegating aid policy to an agent that
is less inequality-averse than the donor. This result is intuitive, and, moreover,
in line with other delegation results in political economy, e.g. the benefits from
delegating monetary policy to a central bank that cares relatively less about
unemployment and more about inflation than society does. I show that in
the simple model used here, the result of Svensson (2000a) does not apply
for at least some parameter values. That is, some donor types would like to
delegate aid policy to an agent that is more averse to relative poverty than
themselves because this will spur investment in the recipient country where the
productivity of aid is the lowest and therefore increases in domestic income are
most valuable ceteris paribus. The types of donors that would like to have a
“conservative” agent of the type described by Svensson (2000a) are those that
are too inequality-averse in the sense that it is possible to increase the combined
domestic incomes of the recipients by delegating to someone less sensitive to
relative poverty.
The diﬀerences in results derive from the fact that whereas I assume that
recipients are diﬀerent, he assumes that they are identical except possibly for
being hit by diﬀerent exogenous income shocks. In his model, the negative
incentive eﬀects of ex post aid allocation stem from the fact that in states of
the world where recipients are hit by asymmetric shocks, the donor smooths the
consumption diﬀerential, thereby decreasing the incentives for both recipients
to exert “eﬀort” to increase the probability of being in a state where income
is high. Thus, incentives can be improved for both recipients by committing
to being less responsive to consumption diﬀerentials ex post. In my model,
incentives can necessarily only be improved for one of the two recipients. For
example, if the donor delegates aid policy to an agent that is less concerned with
inequality than itself, the optimal level of investment for the recipient where the
productivity of aid is low goes down. The optimal mandate for an agent depends
on the direction in which investment eﬀort has to be shifted in order to result
in a higher level of total domestic incomes in the recipient countries compared
to the donor’s own ex post allocation rule. Regardlessly, the aggregate gain will
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be the result of stronger eﬀort in one recipient more than outweighing weaker
eﬀort in the other. Thus, the economic intuition only depends on the returns
to aid being diﬀerent across recipients, which seems a reasonable assumption.
There are two interesting extensions that I plan to pursue: Firstly, to take
into account that in reality delegation of aid policy is not completely analogous
to, say, delegation of monetary policy in that the principal is not free to pick
an optimal agent. There are potential agents available, NGOs and multilateral
agencies, but none of these can in general be expected to approximate the op-
timal agent from the viewpoint of a bilateral donor. In combination with the
fact that in practice one can delegate responsibility for part of the budget, this
may result in a combination of delegated and non-delegated aid being optimal,
which seems to be what the data in table 1 really suggests. Secondly, analysing
the case where a group of donors consider delegating aid allocation to a com-
mon agent, i.e., a multilateral agency. One would then have a starting point for
anlysing both the positive and the normative aspects of bilateral versus mul-
tilateral aid, which could have important implications for how the system of
international aid should be organised.
6 Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of the propositions and lemmas in the main
text.
i) Proof of Proposition 1
Combining the constraints and and inserting the result into the objective
function, the maximisation problem concerns one variable only, say, BPL . The
first-order condition for the case where ηD 6= 1 is
∂WD
∂BL
=
¡
CPL
¢−ηD ∂CPL
∂BPL
+
¡
CPH
¢−ηD ∂CPH
∂BPL
= 0. (A1)
As ∂C
P
L
∂BPL
= γL and
∂CPH
∂BPL
= −γH , (5) obtains. Part a) concerns the special case
γL = γH . Then the first-order condition reduces to C
P
L = C
P
H . Since the two
recipients invest the same amount in this regime and thus have the same levels
of domestic income, BPL = B
P
H =
1
2B when the productivity of aid is identical.
The solution to part b) starts from C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD . Using BPH = B − BPL ,
defining ΠPj =
(γj)
1−ηD
ηD
(γL)
1−ηD
ηD +(γH)
1−ηD
ηD
, and rewriting domestic incomes in terms of
aid equivalents one arrives at the aid allocation functions BPj = ΠPj RP − yPj .
ii) Proof of Lemma 1
The lemma most easily proved by calculating the eﬀect of ηD onΨ =
ΠPL
1−ΠPL
=³
γL
γH
´ 1−ηD
ηD , which is increasing in ΠPL . Taking logs, one finds that 1Ψ
∂Ψ
∂ηD
=
− 1
(ηD)2
ln
³
γL
γH
´
, which is positive since γL < γH . Hence,
∂ΠPL
∂ηD
> 0 and part
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a) is proven. As ηD → 1, it may be seen that Ψ → 1. Accordingly, ΠPL → 12 .
In combination with ∂Π
P
L
∂ηD
> 0, this means that ΠPL R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1, concluding
the proof of part b). The limit of lnΨ as ηD → 0 is −∞, demonstrating
that LimηD→0Ψ = 0 ⇔ LimηD→0ΠPL = 0. A similar exercise shows that
LimηD→∞ΠPL =
γH
γL+γH
. Hence, ΠPL ∈
³
0, γHγL+γH
´
∀ηD ∈ (0,∞).
iii) Proof of Proposition 2
In the precommitment case, Bj only aﬀects Cj directly because the recipients
see the aid accruing to them as fixed when they make their investment decision.
When the donor operates under discretion, it moves after the investment deci-
sions have been made and so it treats the investment levels as fixed. The result
is that the first-order condition for an optimal aid allocation is identical to (A1)
with the exception of the levels of domestic income in the recipient countries.
However, the fact that investment levels in the recipient countries go down has
no eﬀect on the distribution of consumption desired by the donor. That is, it is
still the case that C
P
H
CPL
=
³
γH
γL
´ 1
ηD , and so the share of total available resources
consumed by each recipient is the same as in the precommitment regime. For
future reference, denote the common share of L when the donor allocates aid
according to its own preferences by Π∗L.
iv) Proof of proposition 3
With the assumptions on preferences and technology made in the main text,
IDj = E −
¡
κΠ∗j
¢− 1µ . One then arrives at yD = y∗ − κ · (κΠ∗L)− 1µγL + (κΠ∗H)− 1µγH
¸
,
where y∗ =
³
κE
γL
+ κEγH
´
is the level of combined income attained by the re-
cipients if they both invest their endowments. Taking the first and second
derivatives of this expression demonstrates that yD is a function that has a
unique global maximum at Π∗L =
(γH)
µ
1+µ
(γL)
µ
1+µ+(γH)
µ
1+µ
≡ bΠ. Since γH > γL,bΠ ∈ ³12 , γHγL+γH ´.
v) Proof of Lemma 2
By Lemma 1, ∂Π
∗
L
∂ηD
> 0 and Π∗L R 12 ⇔ ηD R 1. As was just demonstrated,bΠ > 12 . It follows that ∃ηD > 1 such that Π∗L = bΠ. I denote this specific value
of the degree of inequality-aversion by bη.
vi) Proof of Proposition 4
The first line of (11) in the main text contains the derivatives dC
A
L
dΠAL
and dC
A
H
dΠAL
.
From (6) one obtains
dCAL
dΠAL
= γLR
A + γLΠAL
∂RA
∂ΠAL
; (A2a)
dCAH
dΠAL
= −γHRA + γH
¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂RA
∂ΠAL
. (A2b)
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Now ∂R
A
∂ΠAL
= ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
since the aid budget is given. Using C
A
L
CAH
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1
ηA , we
may therefore rewrite the first-order condition as
¡
CAL
¢−ηD
γL



·
RA +ΠAL
∂yA
∂ΠAL
¸
+
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA
·¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂yA
∂ΠAL
−RA
¸
 = 0.
(A3)
It follows that at the optimum, the expression in curly brackets must be zero.
This results in (12). The second derivative of the donor’s objective function with
respect to ΠAL is
∂2WD
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = −ηD ¡CAL ¢−ηD−1µdCALdΠAL
¶2
− ηD
¡
CAH
¢−ηD−1µdCAH
dΠAL
¶2
(A4)
+
¡
CAL
¢−ηD d2CAL
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 + ¡CAH¢−ηD d2CAH
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2
The first two terms can be seen to be negative. The second-order derivatives
of stage 3 consumption with respect to the share allocated to L are
d2CAL
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = γL
Ã
2
∂yA
∂ΠAL
+ΠAL
∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2
!
; (A5a)
d2CAH
d
¡
ΠAL
¢2 = γH
Ã¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 − 2 ∂yA∂ΠAL
!
. (A5b)
By the definition of bη ∂yA∂ΠAL = 0 when ηA = bη. We also know that ∂2yA∂(ΠAL)2 < 0.
Thus, for ηA∗ = ηD = bη the second-order condition for a maximum holds. For
ηA∗ 6= ηD, ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
6= 0. Using (A5a) and (A5b) as well as CAL
CAH
=
³
γL
γH
´ 1
ηA , the last
two terms of (A4) may be written as
γL
¡
CAL
¢−ηD 


ΠAL +
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA ¡
1−ΠAL
¢ ∂2yA
∂
¡
ΠAL
¢2 + 2 ∂yA∂ΠAL

1−
µ
γL
γH
¶ ηD−ηA
ηA





(A6)
For ηD < ηA∗, the expression in the second square bracket is negative. At
the same time, ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
> 0. When ηD > ηA∗, 1−
³
γL
γH
´ ηD−ηA
ηA > 0 while ∂y
A
∂ΠAL
< 0.
So it is unambiguous that ∂
2WD
∂(ΠAL)
2 < 0.
Notes on the logarithmic case
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When ηD = 1, (A1) becomes
1
CPL
γL − 1CPH γH = 0. It is straightforward
to calculate that now BPj =
1
2R
P − yPj . Of course, it is still the case that
BPj = B
D
j . At ηA = ηD, where ΠAL = 0.5 and
∂yA
∂ΠAL
> 0 (c.f. Proposition 3),
∂WD
∂ΠAL
=
¡
CAL
¢−1 dCAL
dΠAL
+
¡
CAH
¢−1 dCAH
dΠAL
= 2
RA
∂yA
∂ΠAL
> 0. So, as for other values of
ηD below bη, it is indeed the case that a donor having such preferences would
like to delegate aid policy to an agent with a mandate more sensitive to relative
poverty than the donor’s own discretionary policy would be.
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Table 1: % of Total Net Disbursements of ODA, 2001 
Country 
1.  
Bilateral 
ODA 
2.  
To NGOs  
3.  
To 
Multilateral 
Institutions 
4.  
Delegated aid 
(2+3) 
5.  
Non-
delegated aid 
(1-2) 
Australia 75.7 0.1 24.3 24.4 75.6 
Austria 64.1 0.3 35.9 36.2 63.8 
Belgium 57.9 0.6 42.1 42.7 57.3 
Canada 78.3 11.0 21.7 32.7 67.3 
Denmark 63.3 0.6 36.7 37.3 62.7 
Finland 57.7 1.1 42.3 43.4 56.6 
France 61.8 0.6 38.2 38.8 61.2 
Germany 57.2 . 42.8 . . 
Greece 40.9 . 59.1 . . 
Ireland 64.3 9.6 35.7 45.3 54.7 
Italy 27.2 5.2 72.8 78.0 22.0 
Japan 75.7 1.8 24.3 26.1 73.9 
Luxembourg 75.2 0.6 24.8 25.4 74.6 
Netherlands 70.1 9.8 29.9 39.7 60.3 
New Zealand 75.9 4.4 24.1 28.5 71.5 
Norway 69.9 . 30.1 . . 
Portugal 68.3 0.6 31.7 32.3 67.7 
Spain 66.2 0.3 33.8 34.2 65.8 
Sweden 72.3 5.1 27.7 32.8 67.2 
Switzerland 71.0 3.6 29.0 32.6 67.4 
UK 57.3 4.1 42.7 46.9 53.1 
USA 72.5 . 27.5 . . 
DAC Average 66.9 2.2 33.1 35.3 64.7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the DAC (2002). 
Note: . denotes missing information. 
 
 
Table 2: Order of Moves in Different Regimes 
Stage/Regime P D A 
1 Aid policy determined Not applicable Agent selected 
2 Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
Investment simultaneously 
chosen in recipient countries 
3 Aid policy executed by 
donor 
Aid policy determined and 
executed by donor 
Aid policy determined and 
executed by agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: PL as a function of hD. 
 
 
Figure 2: yD as a function of PL. 
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